In this paper we take a historical perspective to examine the effects of managed care and hospital competition on hospital cost and revenue growth during managed care's boom period (1990)(1991)(1992)(1993)(1994), mature period (1995)(1996)(1997)(1998)(1999), and backlash period (2000)(2001)(2002)(2003). We find that while higher managed care presence, in particular, HMOs, was effective in slowing down hospital cost and revenue growth during the boom and the mature periods, its cost containment effect diminished during the backlash period. This result is stable under different specifications and sensitivity analyses. Hospital competition effects, however, remain strong throughout the three periods. It appears that hospital competition effects were initially the result of aggressive selective contracting in the high managed care markets, but were later fueled by the less saturated, but growing managed care markets that seemed to catch up with the more developed markets.
INTRODUCTION
The managed care industry enjoyed a period of rapid growth in the early 1990s (Figure 1 ), fueled by concerns of rising health care costs. Managed care plans adopted strategies that allowed them to aggressively control health care costs, including the use of primary care gatekeepers, negotiating deep discounts with providers, and restricting access to providers outside of the network (Bamezai et al 1999; Draper et al 2002) . However, such strategies created consumer dissatisfaction that surfaced in the later part of the 1990s (Swartz 1999 , Robinson 2001 . The negative portrayals of managed care plans in the media further created a chasm between managed care and consumers/providers, even when a consumer might not have felt dissatisfied with his or her own health plan (Blendon et al. 1998) . Several studies found that managed care plans, in order to retain customers and to mitigate negative media exposure, had relaxed their many once restrictive network requirements and deep discounting (Draper et al 2002; Mays et al 2003 Mays et al , 2004 Marquis et al 2005) . At the same time, consolidation had increased the hospital's market power in local provider markets Gertler 2003, 2005) . Such movement in the provider markets may have further eroded managed care's ability to control the growth of health care costs.
Since its peak enrollment in 1999, managed care plans (especially health maintenance organizations, HMOs) in the private sector have experienced a slow, steady decline in enrollment.
1 During the same period, the Medicare+Choice program also had trouble retaining customers after enjoying a healthy expansion for most of the 1990's (Gold 2003) , although the federal government still looked to managed care as a way to control Medicare costs. Contrary to the decline in private and Medicare enrollment, state and local governments, in the hopes of easing program costs, increasingly put their Medicaid enrollees into managed care plans (see, for example, Figure 1 in Marquis et al 2005, for the historical trend in HMO penetration by payer type). The continuing trend away from capitation and less restrictive practices by managed care plans, and the strengthening of the hospital's market power have left researchers and policymakers to ponder whether managed care can help achieve cost containment goals after the backlash in late 1990s.
In our paper, we take a historical perspective to examine the effects of managed care and competition in the hospital market on hospital financial performance during managed care's boom period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , mature period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , and backlash period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . This paper extends the previous literature in several ways. First, unlike most previous studies that focused on just HMOs, we examine growth in both HMO and PPO (preferred provider organizations) . Second, our panel data allow us to examine the cost containment effect after the start of the backlash. Third, we implement empirical strategies to treat the potential endogeneity problem that might exist between managed care penetration and hospital cost and revenue. Lastly, we estimate interaction effects between the managed care and hospital competition. This approach allows us to identify the potential differential hospital competition effects in areas that experienced different rates of managed care penetration.
BACKGROUND
The rise of the managed care industry has been credited for slowing down cost escalation in the health care industry at least during the first half of the 1990's (Congressional Budget Office 1995; Miller and Luft 1997; Miller and Luft 2002; Glied 2000) . There are generally two types of research examining how managed care shapes the US health care market: one type treats managed care plans as sellers in the insurance market while the other views managed care plans as buyers in the provider market. In the former category most studies focus on the effect of different managed care plan types on utilization and plan costs and have found that HMOs have lower expenditures than FFS plans (Newhouse 1993; Cutler et al. 2000) . However, recent literature indicates that managed care premiums were on the rise after the backlash and economic slowdown in the early 2000s and that health plans were shifting costs to consumers (Gold 2003 , Mays et al 2004 .
In the second type of study, researchers are concerned with the level of managed care penetration in the provider markets (and how it affects provider prices, revenues, and costs). One way that health plans can lower their operating costs and control premium increases is to stimulate price competition amongst providers in order to negotiate lower prices as part of the selective contracting process. Such a process would result in reduced revenue for hospitals, but at the same time encourage efficiency as hospitals are forced to operate at reduced cost. Our study falls into this category and aims to quantify hospitals' financial performance during different phases of the managed care evolution. Morrisey (2001) reviewed the empirical literature on the effects of selective contracting and hospital competition on various aspects of hospital performance such as prices, travel distance, services, and quality. In general, previous studies that examined the effect of managed care growth on hospital cost growth before the backlash have consistently found that HMO growth lowered hospital cost inflation (Gaskin and Hadley 1997; Connor et al 1998; Bamezai et al 1999; Shen and Melnick 2004) and that increased HMO buying power was associated with lower prices of hospital services (Feldman and Wholey 2001) . However, there was no empirical evidence indicating whether such cost containment effect had continued after the start of the purported backlash period.
Hospitals can use market power to counter financial pressure exerted by the managed care plans. Previous studies have found that increased hospital market concentration is associated with hospitals charging higher prices (Melnick et al 1992; Zwanziger et al 2000; Morrisey 2001; Town and Vistnes 2001) . This market power effect continues in the backlash period in two studies that examined the negotiated prices managed care plans obtained after hospital mergers 2005, Capps and Dranove 2004) . A few studies explicitly examined the interactive effects between hospital competition and managed care: Connor et al (1998) and Bamezai et al (1999) both found that the ability of managed care plans to contain cost and revenue growth was substantially limited when the hospital market was highly concentrated. Whether the reduced ability to contain cost in the presence of provider market power was exacerbated after the backlash started remains to be tested.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY

Overview
We examine hospital costs and revenues among all short-term, general, nonfederal hospitals located in MSAs in the United States between 1990 and 2003.
We focus on HMO and PPO effects in three periods: the boom period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) , the mature period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) , and the backlash period (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . We utilize data from the beginning and end points of each period: 1990 and 1994, 1995 and 1999, and, 2000 and 2003 . This allows us to capture the effect of changes in managed care penetration on changes in hospital cost and revenue for each period. The unit of observation is the hospital, and we include hospital and market (MSA) fixed-effects to remove bias that might result from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity across hospitals and MSAs.
Data
Data were drawn from a variety of sources. Hospital data primarily came from Medicare hospital cost reports and the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Surveys. Together, they provided detailed information on hospitals' financial performance, inpatient and outpatient utilization, and other characteristics such as teaching status, multi-hospital system membership. In addition, we obtained the corrected multi-hospital system information from Drs. Kristin Madison and Sujoy Chakravarty.
2 Managed care penetration data were obtained from two sources. The HMO data were provided by Dr. Laurence Baker of Stanford University. 3 The PPO data came from SMG Marketing, Inc (1990 and 1995) and from Interstudy (2000 and . 4 We thank Dr. Jack Zwanziger for making the earlier PPO data available to us. The HMO (PPO) penetration rate is measured as total HMO (PPO) enrollment as a share of MSA population. We further supplemented this dataset with the area wage index, the Area Resource File, the County Business Patterns, and the PPS Impact file as well as other MSA characteristics such as per capita income and population size. 
Empirical Methods
The dependent variable is the logarithm of total operating cost for the cost regression and the logarithm of net patient revenue for the revenue regression. We use the standard translog function to account for the highly skewed distributions of cost and revenue. In our main analysis, we implement two estimation models using different managed care measures. The general equation for the two models is as follows: (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . The interaction term between the mature period dummy and the HMO variable tests whether the effect of HMOs on hospital costs is different in the mature period compared to the base period.
Measures of HMO and PPO Penetration
HMO and PPO penetration rates are measured as HMO and PPO enrollment divided by population at the MSA level. Our goal is to investigate the relationship between these two managed care penetration measures and hospitals' cost and revenue. To do this, we regress hospital cost on HMO and PPO penetration rates. However, there might be unobserved market factors that simultaneously influence the managed care penetration rate and hospital cost and revenue across the markets. We address this problem by using a hospital/market (MSA) fixed-effects model. 6 This fixed-effects translog model has been used extensively in previous studies (Granneman et al. 1986; Bamezai, et al. 1999; Zwanziger, et al. 2000; Shen and Melnick 2004) . To the extent that the unobserved characteristics in the hospital and its managed care market remain stable over time, the hospital/market fixed-effects model would eliminate this potential selection bias.
However, there is a possibility that managed care plans selectively enter markets where they think they will have the greatest effect, and as such, changes in managed care and changes in hospital costs and revenues are endogenously related. To the extent that the endogenous relationship across markets is stable over time, the fixed-effects model would be sufficient. While it is likely that cross-market variations between the managed care penetration level and the hospital cost level are endogenously related, it is not clear whether the change variation between the two measures suffers the same estimation problem. To investigate whether our results are sensitive to this assumption, we estimate a second model (Model 2) by instrumenting for HMO and PPO penetration following the approach by Baker (1997) and Dranove et al (2002) that uses labor market characteristics to capture demand for health plans.
Model 2 is estimated using a two-stage least squares fixed-effects approach. In the first stage, yearly HMO and PPO penetration are estimated separately using the following instruments: the unemployment rate, the percent of white collar workers, the percent of workers in manufacturing, the percent of workers in construction, the percent of self-employed workers, the percent of workers working in large establishments (more than 1000 workers). In the second stage, the "hypothetical" HMO and PPO measures from first stage then become the instruments for the actual HMO and PPO penetration. The standard errors are adjusted to account for the fact that generated values are used as regressors. Furthermore, standard errors of both Models 1 and 2 are adjusted to take into account clustering at the MSA level.
Other Variable Construction
Dependent Variables: Hospital Cost and Revenue
In our analysis we focus on annual total operating costs and total annual net patient revenue 7 , because health plan policies have a more direct effect on 6 MSA is the common market definition used in antitrust analysis of health insurance geographic markets (Hymen and Kovacic, 2004) . Including hospital fixed-effects also subsume market fixedeffects, since we do not include hospitals that change its MSA location. 7 Net patient revenue is total patient revenue minus contractual allowances and discounts on patients' accounts. Both net and total patient revenues are reported in the Medicare hospital cost reports.
operations than on non-operating activities such as income from investments.
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Hospital Competition
Using the 1990-2003 Medicare discharge data extracted from the MEDPAR file, we construct a hospital-level Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) that takes into account multi-hospital system membership for each year., Individual hospital markets are defined using actual zip code level patient flow data, following the detailed method described in Bamezai et al. (1999) . We broadly outline the approach here. First, competing hospitals are identified on a zip code level as those facilities that draw at least one discharge of a zip code area's total discharges. If two hospitals belong to the same system within the same geographic market, they are treated as a single entity and not as competing entities. Next, an HHI is calculated for each zip code based on the share of total discharges among all competing hospitals in the zip code. Finally, the degree of competition facing each hospital is captured by estimating a weighted average of the zip code area's HHIs in its market, with the proportion of discharges it draws from each zip code area serving as the weight. Though this measure is based on Medicare patients only, previously, a comparative correlation analysis was done using data from several states with all payor data, and the two HHI measures were highly correlated (Bamezai et al 1999) .
Medicare and Medicaid Financial Pressure
The study covers periods in which Medicare underwent several major transitions in the payments for general acute hospitals. Most hospitals transitioned from a cost-based system to a fully prospective payment system by 1990. The early 1990s saw several changes in the blends for teaching and disproportionate share payments. In 1998, the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) implemented uniform rate cuts across all general acute hospitals. To capture the effects of these various changes on the financial pressure exerted by Medicare on each hospital, we construct a Medicare fiscal pressure variable following the approach used by others (including Staiger and Gaumer 1992 , Cutler 1998 , and Shen 2003 . Conceptually, the Medicare fiscal pressure is calculated as the difference between a hospital's actual payments compared to the payments that it would have received under the new reimbursement method if the hospital did not change its behavior at all in response to the changing reimbursement policies from Medicare. This measure is then weighted by a hospital's Medicare share of patients. Further details of the variable construction can be found in Shen (2003) and Wu (2005). 9 A Medicaid financial pressure variable was constructed using a measure the generosity of state's Medicaid program. We use the state-level Medicaid physician fee index from Norton and Zuckerman (2000) and the follow-up study by Lewin Group (2003) as the Medicaid financial pressure index. The index is the ratio between each state's physician fee schedule for primary care to the median physician fee of the nation. If a state has an index above 1, it is a more generous state compare to the rest of the nation. If a state's Medicaid financial pressure index is below 1, then it is a less generous state than the median state.
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In addition, we include hospital's share of Medicaid patients to capture the Medicaid pressure for individual hospitals.
RESULTS
We start by looking at the trend in managed care penetration and hospital cost/revenue over the study period. Figures 2A and 2B show trends in hospital operating cost per discharge for hospitals in low and high managed care markets, respectively.
11 In both figures, the solid line represent the trend in operating cost per discharge for hospitals in competitive hospital markets (low hospital HHI) and the dashed line represents the trend for hospitals in concentrated hospital markets (high HHI). For presentation purpose, hospitals are classified as operating in high (low) managed care MSAs if the average managed care penetration over the entire period in that MSA belongs to the top 2 (bottom 2) quintiles of the average managed care 9 We would like to thank Vivian Wu for providing the financial pressure measure for payment changes due to BBA 1997. The financial pressure measures for 1990-1994 were obtained from Shen (2003) . 10 Ideally, we would like to have a Medicaid hospital payment index instead of the physician fee index. However, such measure is not available. What we were able to establish is that state's per capita Medicaid spending on hospital care and on physician services are highly correlated (based on state health expenditure account, the correlation is about 0.6). Therefore the physician fee index should be a reasonable alternative to capture a state Medicaid program's generosity. 11 Hospital operating cost per discharge is computed as total operating cost (as reported in HCRIS) divided by total inpatient discharges. penetration (HMO+PPO) distribution.
12 Similarly, hospitals are classified into concentrated (competitive) hospital markets if the hospital's average HHI over the entire period belongs to the top 2 (bottom 2) quintiles of the hospital HHI distribution. The 2 vertical lines in each figure are visual aids to separate out the three periods.
Figures 2A and 2B both show that although hospitals in competitive hospital markets (solid line) started out having higher operating cost per discharge than those in concentrated hospital markets (dashed line) in 1990, they had slower cost growth in subsequent years, regardless of whether they are in low or high managed care markets. The cost growth differential between competitive and concentrated hospital markets is especially pronounced in high managed care markets. By the end of the study period, those hospitals in competitive markets had lower costs than those in concentrated markets. Comparison of the two solid lines across Figures 2A and 2B shows that among competitive hospital markets, the effect of managed care appears to be most pronounced before 2000 where 12 The average penetration rate is highly correlated with the yearly penetration rate. We use the average penetration rate to classify hospitals to avoid the rare situation that the same hospital might switch category in different years. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of the explanatory variables in our regression model, as well as the labor market characteristics used to construct the instrumented managed care measures. It is interesting to note is while multihospital system membership increased substantially, such that by the end of the period, 66 percent of all hospitals belonged to a system, yet the average hospital HHI did not increase substantially, suggesting that many hospitals joined nonlocal systems.
Mean
13 Cost Regression Results. Table 2 reports the fixed-effects regression results on total annual operating cost. We present the full regression results in Table 2 , but focus our discussion on the key variables. Model 1 uses the actual HMO and PPO penetration rate in each year. The coefficient of HMO variable represents the estimated effect of HMO penetration on hospital operating cost in the base period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) . The -0.377 coefficient indicates that a 10 percentage point difference in HMO penetration is associated with a -3.77 percent difference in operating cost between 1990 and 1994. The interaction terms between HMO measure and the dummy for the mature period (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) indicate that during 1995-1999, a 10 percentage point difference in HMO penetration is associated with an additional -1.0 percent difference in cost compared to the base period. In other words, a 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is associated with 4.8 percent (3.8+1.0) reduction in operating cost during the mature period, and the difference in the cost reduction effect is statistically significant between the base and the mature period. However, by the backlash period, the cost containment effect weakens. Although higher HMO penetration continues to be associated with lower hospital cost, the effect is not as large as during the mature period. We do not find higher PPO penetration to be associated with lower cost in any of the three periods. This may be due in part to the fact that the PPO measures is subject to attenuation bias, because it is measured with much greater measurement errors than the HMO measure.
The competition effects follow a different pattern over the years. In the 1990-1994 period, hospitals in less competitive markets (higher HHI) tended to have lower costs: an 10 percentage point increase in hospital HHI is associated with -0.74 percent reduction in cost, although this negative relationship is not statistically significant. However, between 1995 and 1999, a 10 percentage point increase in HHI is associated with 1.4 percentage increase (-0 cost. The hospital competition effects became more pronounced in the backlash period, where a 10 percentage point increase in HHI is associated with 3.2 percent increase in cost. Model 2 replaces the actual HMO and PPO penetration with the instrumented penetration values. The instrumented HMO and PPO penetration rates are strong predictors of the actual penetration rate: the F-statistic from the first stage is around 20. The estimated effects of HMO penetration are similar between Models 1 and 2, but the coefficients and the standard errors of the HMO effect are much bigger in Model 2, as expected under two-stage least square estimation. This model suggests that a 10 percentage point increase in HMO penetration is associated with 13 percent reduction in cost during the base period and an additional 1.4 percent reduction in the mature period. But both models support the backlash hypothesis: by 2003, the cost containment effect of HMOs weakened. The effect of PPO remains statistically insignificant under Model 2. The coefficients on the competition measures remain stable and both models indicate that hospital competition effects grew over time, even in the backlash period.
In Model 3, we augment Model 1 by adding interaction term between the HMO and Hospital HHI variables. Although we present the full regression results in the last column of Table 2 , the coefficients on the key variables become difficult to interpret because of collinearity among the two-way and three-way interactions. Instead, we evaluate the marginal effects of hospital competition at two different levels of HMO penetration (0.10 and 0.45) and present the results in Table 4. 14 The standard errors on the marginal effects are obtained using jackknife replication methods to account of clustering at the MSA level. Table 4 shows that in low HMO market with only 0.1 HMO penetration rate, the effect of hospital competition on hospital cost is small before the backlash period. In fact, during 1990-1994, there appears to be a negative effect of hospital competition on cost. But in 2000-2003, a 10 percentage point increase in HHI is associated with 3.07 percent increase in cost in low HMO market. The effect of competition is stronger in high HMO market with penetration rate of 0.45. A 10 percentage point increase in HHI is associated with 1.0 percent increase in operating cost during the base period. The effect grew stronger in later periods and by the backlash period, a 10 percentage point increase in HHI is associated with almost 4 percent increase in cost. Note that by the backlash period, the effect of hospital competition in low HMO markets has caught up with that in high HMO markets. Tables 2 and 3 Standard errors are adjusted to reflect clustering at the MSA level. Based on Model 3, we also evaluate the marginal effects of HMO at two different levels of hospital competition (HHI=0. 25 and 0.6, respectively) 15 and report the results in Table 5 . Table 5 shows that HMO has bigger cost containment effect in competitive hospital markets (HHI=0.25) than in concentrated hospital markets (HHI=0.6). In competitive markets, the largest effect occurs in the mature period, where a 10 percentage point increase in HMO is associated with -6.3 percent reduction in operating cost. In concentrated markets, the cost containment effect does not grow weaker in the backlash period, but the effect is still smaller compared to that in competitive hospital markets.
Revenue Regression Results. We also examine the revenue growth during the same time periods. Full regression results for patient revenue are presented in Table 3 , and the marginal effects of hospital competition and HMO based on Model 3 are reported in the bottom panels of Tables 4 and 5. The revenue trends follow the same pattern as the cost trends and the HMO and hospital competition coefficients are very similar between Tables 2 and 3. While HMO and competition affects hospitals' net patient revenue streams, hospitals appear to be able to adjust their expenditure pattern in response to changes in those two market factors as well. Tables 2 and 3 Standard errors are adjusted to reflect clustering at the MSA level. Sensitivity Analysis. The three models presented above paint a consistent story that HMOs are less effective in containing costs in the backlash period than in the previous periods. We performed several sensitivity analyses to test the robustness of this finding. First, we experimented with additional instruments, such as using physician market information (total MDs per capita, number of general practitioners per capita). 16 These produced very similar results. Second, since our unbalanced panel could be due to hospitals entering and exiting the markets or failure to report data throughout the period, we limited the sample to hospitals that have data in all years. Although this reduced sample size substantially, coefficients on the key variables remained stable. Lastly, we have HMO data for all years between 1990 and 2003 but only few years for PPO. We re-estimate Model 1 using all available years but drop PPO measure from the model. Coefficients on HMO and hospital HHI variables are extremely close to the original model (results available upon request). Our conclusion remains the same.
DISCUSSION
The health care market has experienced significant changes over the past 15 years. Providers have come under pressures from the payer side, either through payment policy changes or the growing presence of the managed care industry. Previous literature found that managed care plans (in particular HMOs) were effective in slowing down cost growth in the hospital sector. However, in recent years, the managed care industry reversed their once restrictive management tools to mitigate a backlash related to negative media coverage and employers responding to employee dissatisfaction with restrictive forms of managed care. In our study, we aimed to quantify the cost containment effects of managed care and hospital competition during three distinctive periods (the boom period, the mature period, and the backlash period), taking into account changes in other aspects of the health care payment and delivery system. We find that while higher managed care presence was indeed associated with lower hospital cost and revenue during the boom and the mature periods, it appears that managed care has weakened its power to contain cost during the backlash period, especially in competitive hospital markets. This result persists under different estimation methods and sensitivity analyses. On the other hand, the cost constraining effects of local market competition appear to persist throughout the three periods: on average more concentrated hospital markets (higher HHIs) are associated with higher cost, and the cost difference between competitive and concentrated markets grew larger in later periods.
Our findings on the interaction effects between hospital competition and HMO penetration during the boom period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) are consistent with previous findings in Bamezai et al (1999) : both studies find that in the boom period greater hospital competition is associated with greater cost containment effects in areas with high levels of managed care penetration and vice versa. Although hospitals in more competitive markets continued to have lower cost than those in concentrated markets in the later period, the cost gap did not grow in the backlash period compared to the mature period. This result suggests that the selective contracting effect of HMO maybe level off in saturated HMO markets during the backlash period.
At the same time, there appears to be little competition effect during the initial boom period for hospitals in the low HMO markets. The low penetration of HMO during the initial years (17 percent in 1990) is unlikely to exert much downward pressure even in competitive markets. But the cost gap becomes more pronounced during the mature and backlash periods, when HMO penetration grew to an average of 42 percent even in low HMO markets. It would appear that the persistent competition effect was initially the result of aggressive selective contracting in the high HMO markets, but was later present in the less saturated but growing HMO markets that seemed to catch up with the more highly penetrated and developed markets.
While we provide empirical evidence of the weakening effect of HMO during the backlash period, we cannot identify the sources. The backlash effect may include relaxation of utilization review, less aggressive selective contracting (possibly associated with broadening of provider networks), and/or a shift in enrollment away from HMOs, with greater cost control features, to PPOs. We have some indirect evidence that the selective contracting effect might dominate the utilization effect. Model 3 with interaction effects indicates that competition effect did not grow stronger in highly saturated HMO markets during the backlash period. Since HMO plans have been shown to leverage competition among hospitals to negotiate contracts, the leveling off of the competition effect in these markets suggests a weakening of selective contracting.
Given our findings, the current trends of rising health care costs and expenditures are potentially troubling in the long run. Our findings suggest that managed care, in particular, HMO, which had helped control rising health expenditures in the U.S. during much of the 1990's, may have run its course in terms of its increasing effectiveness in controlling health cost inflation. It would be interesting to follow up with more recent data to examine if the cost containment effect continues to weaken to the point that it becomes completely ineffective, especially given the continuing erosion of HMO by other forms of health plans. If the observed weakening of managed care is due primarily to a pull back of utilization review and HMO enrollment, it may be possible to reverse these policies if consumers are willing to accept these restrictions in return for slower rates of growth in health care inflation. Alternatively, if it is due to other more structural factors, such as the formation of multi-hospital systems which may weaken the effectiveness of selective contracting, then a return to the mature period where managed care was more effective may not be possible. Further, current policies designed to move more Medicaid and Medicare populations into managed care plans may not have the desired effect of slowing down the double digit cost growth in the hospital market. However, it might have desirable effects on other aspects of care delivery. Even though managed care plans may have cutback on their practices of utilization management, they are reportedly expanding on their disease management and preventive care services (Draper et al 2002; Mays et al 2003) . A complete evaluation of the backlash effects necessarily involves an examination of many other aspects of the health care system, such as whether access to care and quality of care improved as a result of less restrictive managed care practices.
